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Male, Pale, and Stale? Diversity in Lawyers' Regulatory Leadership
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Abstract: When lawyers elect the leaders of their self-regulatory organizations, what sort of
people do they vote for? How does electoral system design affect the ability of law societies and
bar associations to understand and regulate a diverse legal profession? This article
quantitatively assesses the demographic and professional diversity of leadership in the Law
Society of Upper Canada. After many years of underrepresentation, in 2015 non-white
members and women were elected in numbers proportionate to their shares of Ontario lawyers.
Regression analysis suggests that being non-white was not a disadvantage in the 2015 election,
and being female actually conferred an advantage in attracting lawyers’ votes. The diverse
employment contexts of the province’s lawyers were also represented in the elected group.
However early career lawyers were completely unrepresented. This is largely a consequence of
electoral system design choices, and can be remedied through the implementation of career
stage constituencies.

Re

The importance of diversity is routinely proclaimed by leaders of the legal
profession.2 Socio-legal scholars, testing these proclamations against reality, have evaluated

vi

the diversity of large corporate law firms, law schools, and the judiciary.3 However, similarly
thorough study has not yet been made of diversity within the leadership of law societies and

ew
University of Windsor Faculty of Law. The author is grateful for the assistance of research assistants Myla
Picco and Victor Wong, and for the assistance of Dan Edelstein (Academic Director, Windsor Research Data
Centre).
2 E.g. “Futures: Transforming the Delivery of Legal Services in Canada,” CBA Legal Futures Initiative, 2014,
accessed July 20, 2016, http://www.cbafutures.org/cba/media/mediafiles/PDF/Reports/Futures-Finaleng.pdf; “Diversity and Inclusion,” American Bar Association, accessed July 20, 2016,
http://www.americanbar.org/diversity.html.
3 See e.g. Elizabeth Chambliss, “Miles to Go: Progress of Minorities in the Legal Profession,” (2004): 5-7,
accessed July 20, 2016,
http://apps.americanbar.org/abastore/products/books/abstracts/4520014_2005%20execsumm.pdf; Faisal
Bhabha, “Towards a Pedagogy of Diversity in Legal Education,” Osgoode Hall Law Journal 52 (2015), accessed
July 20, 2016, digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2792&context=ohlj; Sabrina Lyon
and Lorne Sossin, “Data and Diversity in the Canadian Justice Community,” Journal of Law and Equality 11
(2014), accessed July 20, 2016,
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1062&context=olsrps [hereinafter Data
and Diversity]; Jesse Rothstein and Albert H. Yoon, “Affirmative Action in Law School Admissions: What Do
Racial Preferences Do?,” University of Chicago Law Review 75 (2008): 649, accessed July 20, 2016,
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14276; Jason P. Nance and Paul E. Madsen, “An Empirical Analysis of Diversity
in the Legal Profession,” Connecticut Law Review 47 (2014): 271, accessed July 20, 2016,
http://connecticutlawreview.org/articles/an-empirical-analysis-of-diversity-in-the-legal-profession/
[hereinafter An Empirical Analysis]; Avner Levin and Asher Alkoby, "Barriers to the Profession: Inaction in
Ontario, Canada and Its Consequences," Oñati Socio-Legal Series 3 (2013): 580, accessed July 20, 2016,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2283823.
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2
bar associations.4 These organizations are of central importance in North America’s
distinctive self-regulatory approach to legal services regulation.5 In addition to longstanding authority over who can be a lawyer, and over what lawyers must and musn’t do,
lawyers’ self-regulatory organizations increasingly bear responsibility for access to justice
and for reconciling professionalism values with marketplace values.6
When lawyers vote to elect the leaders of these self-regulatory organizations, what
sort of people do they vote for? How representative of Ontario’s diversity are the Law
Society benchers? How does the selection process affect the diversity of self-regulatory

r
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leaders and other elite lawyer sub-groups? To respond to these queries, this article
quantitatively assesses the demographic and professional diversity of leadership in Ontario's
legal services self-regulator, the Law Society of Upper Canada (LSUC). Candidate campaign
materials and voting pattern data from the five LSUC Bencher elections since 1999 provide

Re

the data for the analysis.7

The results suggest that those who currently lead the Law Society (known as

vi

Benchers) are not disproportionately "male and pale." Non-white members and women

ew

were elected in numbers proportionate to their shares of Ontario lawyers in the 2015
election. Regression analysis suggests that being non-white is not a disadvantage in these
elections.8 Being a woman actually seems to confer a surprisingly significant advantage.9

On

This contrasts with the diversity situation in other elite subgroups of Canadian lawyers,
especially the judiciary. The diverse employment contexts of the province’s lawyers were

ly
However, see the American Bar Association's reports on progress towards its diversity goals: “Diversity and
Inclusion”, American Bar Association, (2015), accessed July 20, 2016,
http://www.americanbar.org/diversity.html.
5 Common law jurisdictions elsewhere in the world have generally replaced self-regulation with statedominated “co-regulation.” Law societies and bar associations survive in Northern Europe and Australasia, but
with diminished status as “front line regulators.” Noel Semple, Legal Services Regulation At The Crossroads:
Justitia’s Legions (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2015), 57-60.
6 John Pearson, "Canada’s Legal Profession: Self-Regulating in the Public Interest?" Canadian Bar Review
(2013): 555; Stephen Gillers, "How to Make Rules for Lawyers: The Professional Responsibility of the Legal
Profession" Pepperdine Law Review 40 (2013): 365, accessed July 20, 2016,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2218540; Semple, Justitia's Legions, ibid., 53-57.
Regarding the importance of law societies and their governance, see Section 6, infra.
7 Regarding the methodology of this study, see Section 3 and Appendix, infra.
8 Section 4(A), infra.
9 Section 4(C), infra.
4
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also fairly well represented in the 2015 class of Benchers.10 However one constituency -early career lawyers -- was completely unrepresented in the Law Society's elected
leadership.11
This article begins by reviewing the literature on diversity, or lack thereof, in the legal
profession and its regulatory leadership (Part 1). The Law Society of Upper Canada
(Ontario's legal services regulator) and its election system are introduced in Part 2. The
data source, hypotheses, and methodology for this study are discussed in Part 3. The central
empirical findings of this research, presented in Part 4, assess the diversity of the Law
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Society's elected leadership along dimensions of diversity: visible minority/aboriginal
status, practice context, gender, and career stage. Turning to the broader significance of
these findings, Part 5 considers the effect of selection processes on the diversity of different
elite legal subgroup groups. Part 5 also argues for career stage constituencies in LSUC

Re

Bencher elections, in order to position self-regulatory governance to better serve the public
interest. Part 6 summarizes and concludes.

vi

ew

1. Diversity in the Legal Profession and Its Leadership
Legal professionals in developed countries are usually less demographically diverse
than the general populations from which they are drawn. For example, women and non-

On

white people are generally under-represented among lawyers both in the United States,12
and in Canada.13 Those who do become lawyers also often earn less money than their white
male colleagues. According to Ronit Dinovitzer’s Law and Beyond survey, troubling income

ly

divergences are already apparent just two years after Canadian lawyers are licensed.14 Black
Section 4(B), infra.
Section 4(D), infra.
12 In the United States, Hispanic and non-white Americans together constitute 33% of the population, but only
11% of practicing American lawyers. See “USA QuickFacts from the US Census Bureau,” United States Census
Bureau, accessed July 20, 2016, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html. An additional 15.1% of
the American population identifies as white and Hispanic or Latino. Women are 51% of the American
population, but only 34% of practicing lawyers. See Nance & Madsen, An Empirical Analysis, supra note 3, 287.
13 See “CBA Legal Futures Initiative: Demographic Trends,” The Canadian Bar Association, (2013), accessed July
20, 2016, http://www.cba.org/CBA-Legal-Futures-Initiative/Reports/Demographic-Trends; “Towards a More
Representative Legal Profession: Better Practice, Better Workplaces, Better Results,” The Law Society of British
Columbia, (2012), accessed July 20, 2016,
https://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/docs/publications/reports/Diversity_2012.pdf.
14 Ronit Dinovitzer, “Law and Beyond: A National Study of Canadian Law Graduates,” (2015), accessed July 20,
2016, http://individual.utoronto.ca/dinovitzer/images/LABReport.pdf.
10
11
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lawyers had a median income of $65,000, compared to $78,200 for other lawyer
respondents.15 Female lawyers earned on average only 93% of men’s salaries, just two years
out.16
Diversity in legal positions that are better paid or considered elite often trails behind
diversity in the profession at large. Women and non-white people seem to be “funneled out”
after becoming lawyers: they are less likely to be found in roles such as judge and large firm
partner than they are among “rank and file" lawyers. This is apparently true in several world
jurisdictions,17 including Canada. Of 2,160 Canadian judges analyzed in a recent study, only
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1% were aboriginal and 3% were members of visible minorities.18 Women are also still
significantly underrepresented on the bench, even relative to their share of the legal
profession.19 Canada's large "Bay Street" corporate law firms are suspected in some
quarters of a similar reluctance to diversify their top ranks, 20 although reliable quantitative

Re

data is not yet available on this point.21

vi

16
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Ibid., 63.
Ibid., 48.
17 See “The Australian Legal Profession: A Snapshot of Asian Australian Diversity in 2015,” Asian Australian
Lawyers Association Inc., (2015), accessed July 20, 2016, https://aalavic.files.wordpress.com/2015/04/aalacultural-diversity-analysis-2015-infographic-final.pdf; Nance and Madsen, An Empirical Analysis, supra note 3;
“IILP Review 2014: The State of Diversity and Inclusion in the Legal Profession,” Institute For Inclusion in The
Legal Profession, (2014), accessed July 20, 2016,
http://www.theiilp.com/Resources/Documents/IILP_2014_Final.pdf; Erika Rackley, Clare McGlynn and Aoife
O’Donoghue, “Diversity in the Legal Profession and Judiciary,” accessed July 20, 2016,
https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/law/research/DiversityintheLegalProfessionandJudiciary.pdf; Dina
Medland, “Barriers to Entry: Diversity in Law Firms,” accessed July 20, 2016,
http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=5368a077-53b6-4377-8b12-8c58aad2a9ed.
18 Michael Tutton, "Canada must boost racial diversity in ‘judiciary of whiteness,’ advocates urge,” Toronto Star,
July 18, 2016, accessed July 20, 2016, https://www.thestar.com/news/queenspark/2016/07/18/canadamust-boost-racial-diversity-in-judiciary-of-whiteness-advocates-urge.html; Andrew Griffith, “Diversity among
federal and provincial judges,” Policy Options, May 4, 2016, accessed July 20, 2016,
<http://policyoptions.irpp.org/2016/05/04/diversity-among-federal-provincial-judges/. These proportions
are well below their shares in the population at large: see section 4(A) infra.
19 Ibid. See also Rosemary Cairns Way, “Deliberate Disregard: Judicial Appointments under the Harper
Government,” The Supreme Court Law Review 67 (2014): 43, accessed July 20, 2016,
http://sclr.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/sclr/article/view/39263 and Lyon and Sossin, Data and Diversity,
supra note 3. As of July 2016, the last 22 individuals appointed to the Federal Court were all white. Cristin
Schmitz, “Crampton wants Feds to Diversify colours of court,” The Lawyers Weekly, July 22, 2016, accessed July
20, 2016, http://www.lawyersweekly-digital.com/lawyersweekly/3560?folio=1&pg=2#pg2.
20 David Doorey, “How Does a Bay Street Law Firm Make a List of Most Diverse Employers?” Law of Work Blog,
February 21, 2012, accessed July 20, 2016, http://lawofwork.ca/?p=4832; "Mission Statement," A Call to Action
Canada, accessed July 20, 2016, http://www.acalltoactioncanada.com/mission-statement.
21 Lyon and Sossin, Data and Diversity, supra note 3, 102-105.
15
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Nevertheless, progress toward legal profession diversity has been made in parts of
the world, especially at the entry level. In most developed countries the newest cohorts of
lawyers include approximately equal numbers of men and women.22 Proportionate
representation has also been achieved by black and minority ethnic (BME) individuals
among the solicitors and barristers of England & Wales,23 and by Asian-born individuals
among Australia's solicitors.24
Quantitative data can help us understand the profession's diversity challenges,
successes and opportunities.25 This article therefore offers a quantitative diversity analysis
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of one elite lawyer sub-group: leaders of the Law Society of Upper Canada. The Law Society
(or LSUC) is the self-regulatory organization governing Ontario legal professionals.
Demographic dimensions of diversity such as gender, visible minority status, and

Re

aboriginal status are important in this context. As Faisal Bhabha notes, all of Canada's law
societies including LSUC have made institutional commitments to diversity along such
demographic dimensions.26 However, professional dimensions of diversity, such as firm size

vi

and geographical location, are also relevant. Are sole practitioners, lawyers in firms of

ew

different sizes, and in-house corporate and government lawyers found in numbers
proportionate to their numbers in the profession? How well are lawyers at different stages
of their careers represented?

On

Demographic and professional diversity in regulatory leadership is a matter of equity,
but also arguably a matter of professional vitality. Commentators have suggested that the

ly

robust form of self-regulation enjoyed by American and Canadian lawyers is at risk of being
replaced by state-dominated "co-regulation," as it already has in the United Kingdom and
47% of J.D. degrees in the United States are awarded to women. Re UK barristers see “Called to the Bar
Statistics,” Bar Standards Board, accessed July 20, 2016, https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/mediacentre/research-and-statistics/statistics/called-to-the-bar-statistics/; “The Profile of Solicitors of NSW Final
Report,” Urbis, (March 2015), accessed July 20, 2016,
http://www.lawsociety.com.au/cs/groups/public/documents/internetcontent/942948.pdf.
23 See “Staff Diversity Monitoring Data,” Solicitors Regulation Authority, accessed July 20, 2016,
http://www.sra.org.uk/sra/equality-diversity/data/diversity-monitoring.page [hereinafter SRA Staff]; Bar
Standards Board, supra note 22.
24 See Monica Tan, “Asian-Australian Lawyers Still Bump Up Against Legal Industry’s “Bamboo Ceiling," The
Guardian (2015), accessed July 20, 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/apr/27/asianaustralians-lawyers-still-bump-up-against-legal-industrys-bamboo-ceiling; NSW Final Report, supra note 22.
25 Lyon and Sossin, Data and Diversity, supra note 3.
26 Bhabha, supra note 3, 65. See also American Bar Association, supra note 4: "Goal III: Eliminate Bias and
Enhance Diversity."
22
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6
Australia.27 Drawing on perspectives from a diverse group of leaders may strengthen
lawyers’ self-regulatory organizations. It can help them make better-informed decisions in
the public interest, on specific discipline files but also on broader policy issues such as legal
education, articling and licensing reform and whether to permit non-lawyer investment in
law firms.
Some legal self-regulatory organizations are diverse by constitutional design. The
American Bar Association House of Delegates, for example, includes representatives of the
Young Lawyers Division, the National Association of Women Lawyers and the Solo, Small
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Firm, and General Practice Division among others.28 The Council of the Law Society of
England and Wales includes seats representing groups such as the Black Solicitors' Network,
the Child Care Law group, and the Junior Lawyers Division.29 By contrast the Law Society of
Upper Canada, which is the focus of this article, ensures geographically diverse

Re

representation but leaves other dimensions of diversity to the candidates and the voters.

vi

2. The Law Society of Upper Canada
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Ontario’s 51,000 licensed legal professionals are regulated by LSUC.30 Compared to
lawyers' self-regulatory organizations in other countries, the Law Society enjoys a
hegemonic position in Ontario legal services regulation.31 It establishes entry, conduct and

On

business structure rules for legal professionals, and it exercises professional discipline, with

ly

See Anthony E. Davis, “Regulation of the Legal Profession in the United States and the Future of Global Law
Practice,” The Professional Lawyer 19:1 (2009): 2, accessed July 20, 2016,
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/proflw19&div=3&id=&page=; Richard E.
Susskind, “Chapter 1,” in Tomorrow’s Lawyers: An Introduction to your Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013).
28 See “American Bar Association Constitution and Bylaws: Rules of Procedure House of Delegates,” American
Bar Association, 2014, at section 6.2 and 6.8, accessed July 20, 2016,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/house_of_delegates/aba_constitution_and_byl
aws_2014.authcheckdam.pdf.
29 See “Council Constituencies,” The Law Society, accessed July 20, 2016, http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/aboutus/our-council/council-constituencies/ [hereinafter Council Constituencies]. Although the Law Society of
England and Wales is not itself a regulator, its Council appoints the members of the Solicitors’ Regulation
Authority.
30 See Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c L.8, accessed July 20, 2016, http://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/90l08
[hereinafter Law Society Act]. Ontario was known as "Upper Canada" prior to 1841, and the regulator's name is
a vestige of that period. See “About the Law Society,” The Law Society of Upper Canada, accessed July 20, 2016,
http://www.lsuc.on.ca/with.aspx?id=905. The 51,000 licensed professionals include 46,000 lawyers and 5,000
licensed paralegals.
31 With the partial exception of Quebec, the law societies in other Canadian provinces enjoy similar powers.
27
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minimal interference from either the government or the courts.32 Law Society membership
is mandatory for all Ontario lawyers and licensed paralegals.33
The Law Society is led by "Benchers," who assemble formally in "Convocation."34
Benchers serve part-time, in a role somewhat comparable to corporate directorship.35 Apart
from the Attorney General (a provincial cabinet minister) and eight non-lawyers appointed
by the government, the voting benchers are elected by licensed legal professionals. Five
benchers are licensed paralegals, and 40 are licensed lawyers. In addition to making major
policy decisions and serving on disciplinary hearing panels, the Benchers elect a Treasurer

Society. 36

r
Fo

to serve as their President, and appoint a permanent Chief Executive Officer of the Law

A. Law Society Bencher Elections

Re

The focus of this paper is the 40 elected lawyer benchers, who make up
approximately 75% of those eligible to vote on most Law Society decisions.37 Elections for
lawyer benchers are held every four years, most recently in April of 2015. Any lawyer

vi

whose license has not been suspended may be a candidate, provided that he or she is

years (3 terms).39

ew

nominated by five other lawyers.38 There is a term limit for elected lawyer benchers of 12

In the terminology of electoral design, lawyer benchers are elected under a multi-

On

member, two-district plurality voting system. The electoral constituencies are based on
geography. Each Ontario lawyer may vote for up to 20 candidates practicing law within the

ly

City of Toronto, and for up to 20 candidates practicing law elsewhere in the province.40 One
distinctive feature of this electoral system is that while there are two districts (Toronto and
Ibid, Justitia's Legions, supra note 5, 53-60.
Law Society Act, supra note 30.
34 Ibid, section 10.
35 Re compensation for benchers, see Yamri Taddese, “How much do benchers earn?” Law Times, August 27,
2015, accessed July 20, 2016, http://digital.lawtimesnews.com/i/500799-april-27-2015/1#.
36 See Law Society Act, supra note 30, section 7.
37 Law Society Act, supra note 30, section 12-23.
38 See The Law Society of Upper Canada, By-Law 3, (2007), section 8(2), accessed July 20, 2016,
https://www.lsuc.on.ca/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2147484279 [hereinafter By-Law 3].
39 Ibid,, section 7(2).
40 While Toronto is home to 21% of Ontario's population, 54% of the province's lawyers practice in this city.
This probably reflects the concentration of corporate headquarters and public sector employers in the city. See
Jamie Baxter and Albert Yoon, “The Geography of Civil Legal Services in Ontario” (November 2011): 36,
accessed July 20, 2016, http://www.lsuc.on.ca/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2147486236.
32
33
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non-Toronto),41 each voting lawyer can vote for up to 20 candidates from each district,
regardless of where the voter resides. This ensures that non-Toronto candidates make up
half of Convocation, which would otherwise be unlikely.42
In a further effort to ensure that all regions are heard from, a "Regional Bencher"
provision was adopted in 1999. This system divides the province into 8 regions, and
designates the candidate practicing within each region who receives the most votes from the
voters in that region as "Regional Bencher.”43 The Regional Bencher provision does not add
to the count of 40 elected lawyer benchers, but it does ensure that Convocation will include

r
Fo

lawyers from across the province.

However, the regional districts and constituencies also mean that non-Toronto
candidates with relatively few votes are elected in lieu of Toronto candidates with

Re

significantly more votes. For example, in the 2015 bencher election Fred Bickford was
elected regional bencher for the sparsely-populated Northwest region of Ontario.44 Mr.
Bickford received 101 votes from lawyers in that region, along with 778 votes from lawyers

vi

in the rest of the province for a total of 879 votes.45 By contrast, Toronto candidates Tanya

ew

Walker and Renatta Austin received 2871 and 2329 votes respectively but were not elected
because they stood 22nd and 27th within the Toronto district.46
Walker and Austin are both women in their first decades of practice, and they are both

On

members of visible minorities. Their candidacies exemplify the apparently deleterious -although presumably unintended -- effect that the regional constituency system has on other

ly

dimensions of diversity. This topic is further considered in Parts 5 and 6 of the paper.
See By-Law 3, supra note 38, section 6(1).
See section 5A, infra.
43 By-Law 3, supra supra note 38,, section 6(4)(1).
44 See “2015 Bencher Election Results,” The Law Society of Upper Canada, accessed July 20, 2016,
https://www.lsuc.on.ca/uploadedFiles/2015-bencher-election-results.pdf.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid. Walker, however, was appointed to Convocation to fill the vacancy caused when Toronto bencher Paul
Schabas became Treasurer in July of 2016 (Alex Robinson, “First Black Female Bencher Elected in Toronto,”
Law Times July 11, 2016, accessed July 20, 2016, http://www.lawtimesnews.com/201607115520/headlinenews/first-black-female-bencher-elected-in-toronto). Likewise, the candidate who stood 21st in the Toronto
election, Isfahan Merali, was appointed to Convocation to fill the vacancy caused when Toronto bencher Janet
Minor became Treasurer. See “Convocation - Election of Benchers,” The Law Society of Upper Canada, accessed
July 20, 2016,
http://www.lsuc.on.ca/uploadedFiles/For_the_Public/About_the_Law_Society/Convocation_Decisions/2015/c
onvocation-may-2015-consent.pdf.
41
42
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3. Methodology
A. Data Source
This analysis draws on data about 486 bencher candidacies, from the five Law Society
elections held since 1999. This data was obtained from the Law Society’s election records
and from bencher election candidate guides.47 The guides contain a one page statement and
a picture from each candidate in each election. A candidate's statement typically includes
biographical information, policy proposals, and occasionally endorsements from individuals
or organizations.

r
Fo

For each candidacy, the outcome measures were (i) whether or not the candidate was
elected, and (ii) the candidate's vote share, expressed as a percentage. If a candidate had a
20% vote share in the 2015 election, that means her name was selected by 20% of all
lawyers voting in that election.48 The average vote share among all 486 candidacies was

Re

15.1%, and the average elected candidate had a vote share of 22.7%. Because of the regional
constituency system described above, the elected candidates were not always those with the

vi

highest vote shares.49

ew

The key independent variables were the various "dimensions of diversity" applicable to
the candidates. These were (i) Region; (ii) Visible Minority / Aboriginal Status; (iii) Practice
Context (firm size or employment status); (iv) Gender; and (v) Career Stage (for 2015

On

candidates only). A sixth independent variable, Name Recognition Proxy Measure, was
added to help isolate the effects of the others.50 The research team gathered this information

ly

about each candidate from the candidate statements (supplemented, where necessary, by
internet searches). Data was stored and analyzed in a FileMaker Pro database, in Excel
spreadsheets, and in the SPSS statistical analysis package.
See “The Law Society of Upper Canada 1999 Bencher Election Guide for Voters,” The Law Society of Upper
Canada; “The Law Society of Upper Canada 2003 Bencher Election Voters’ Guide,” The Law Society of Upper
Canada; “The Law Society of Upper Canada 2007 Bencher Election Voters’ Guide,” The Law Society of Upper
Canada; “The Law Society of Upper Canada 2011 Bencher Election Voting Guide,” The Law Society of Upper
Canada, accessed July 20, 2016, http://www.lsuc.on.ca/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2147484511;
“Voting Guide 2015 Bencher Election,” The Law Society of Upper Canada, accessed July 20, 2016,
https://www.lsuc.on.ca/uploadedFiles/bencher-election-2015-voting-guide.pdf.
48 Vote share is a more useful measure of the support for a candidate than total number of votes received,
because the total number of ballots cast varied significantly between elections.
49 Section 2(A), supra.
50 For further explanation of these variables, see the Appendix to this article.
47
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B. Hypotheses
The author formulated the five top-level hypotheses with regard to this data.
Hypothesis 1. Non-white people are funneled out:
1a. in the process of becoming lawyers (they are less likely than white people
are to be lawyers);
1b. in the Bencher nomination process (they are less likely than white people
are to be Bencher candidates);

r
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1c. in the Bencher elections (they attract fewer votes than white candidates
do).

Hypothesis 2. For those in private practice, the size of the firm in which a candidate

Re

practices is positively correlated with the candidate’s vote share (candidates from
larger firms get more votes).

vi

Hypothesis 3. Women are funneled out:

ew

3a. in the process of becoming lawyers (they are less likely than men are to be
lawyers);

3b. in the Bencher nomination process (they are less likely than men are to be

On

candidates for Bencher);

3c. in the Bencher elections (they attract fewer votes than male candidates

Hypothesis 4. Early-career lawyers are funneled out:

ly

do).

4a. in the Bencher nomination process (they are less likely than later-career
lawyers are to be Bencher candidates);
4b. in the Bencher elections (they attract fewer votes than later-career
candidates do).
Hypothesis 5. The status quo geographic constituency voting system reduces the
diversity of the elected benchers, compared to a hypothetical system in which the
top vote-getters are elected regardless of where they practice.
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C. Analysis of Data
Representativeness along the dimensions of diversity was analyzed by comparing
each class of elected Benchers to: (i) all candidates in that election, (ii) the population of
Ontario lawyers at the time of the election, and (iii) the entire population of Ontario at the
time of the election (where applicable). The effects of candidate characteristics on voter
behaviour were estimated using ordinary linear regression, with candidate vote share as the
dependent variable. This method estimates the effect of different candidate diversity
attributes (e.g. being non-white or being a woman) on voters’ willingness to support that
candidate.51
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Omitted variable bias and selection effects are possible problems with this method
for estimating effects on voter behaviour.52 It could be that an unmeasured variable exerts
an influence on voter behaviour and renders one or more of the apparent effects spurious.

Re

For example, female candidate gender appears to have a significant positive effect on voter
support.53 The Name Recognition Proxy Measure data, described in the Appendix, was

vi

collected to test whether this was actually a consequence of differing levels of name
recognition among male and female candidates.54 The regression analysis suggests that this

ew

is not the case.55 However, it remains possible that controlling for some other unknown
variable would diminish or eliminate the effects reported here.

On

It is also important to note that the candidates were self-selected, not randomly
selected, from the population of Ontario lawyers. This makes it conceivable that the
candidates differ from the lawyer population in a manner which skews this study’s results.

ly

Nevertheless, the results presented here illuminate voters’ preferences in choosing among
Importantly, regression analysis estimates the effect of each independent variable, holding constant the other
variables. For example, if the average female candidate receives more votes than the average male candidate,
this might indicate a voter preference for female candidates. However, it might also reflect the fact that women
are more likely than men to have some other characteristic (e.g. many years of experience as a lawyer) which
makes them more appealing to voters, and the voters are indifferent to candidate gender. Regression analysis
estimates the independent effect of gender while holding constant other variables such as years of experience.
52 Maxwell Palmer, “Does the Chief Justice Make Partisan Appointments to Special Courts and Panels?” Journal
of Empirical Legal Studies 13 (2016): 153, accessed July 20, 2016,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jels.12100/abstract.
53 Infra, section 4(C).
54 The author speculated that the average female candidate might have better name recognition than the
average male candidate, because little-known women are less likely than little-known men to run in these
elections.
55 Infra, section 4(C).
51
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actual candidates, and there is no reason in particular to believe that the candidate sample is
skewed in a meaningful way.
The regression results for all candidates in the five elections were as follows. Results
that are statistically significant at the 0.05 level are in boldface. Part 4 (below) will discuss
the statistically significant findings from this regression analysis.
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Table 1 Regression Analysis: All Candidates

Sample: All Candidates 1999-2015 (n =
485)
Dependent Variable: Vote Share
Parameter
Intercept
Candidate Region = Not Toronto
Candidate Region = Toronto

B
.225

Std.
Error
.013

t
17.401

Sig.
.000

-.034

.007

-4.989

.000

.010

.381

.703

.008

-5.329

.000

-.082

.014

-5.942

.000

-.060

.009

-6.528

.000

.008

-1.498

.135

0a

r
Fo

.004

Non-White Member = 1 (Yes)

0a

Candidate Female = 0 (No)

-.040

Candidate Female = 1 (Yes)

0a

Re

Non-White Member = 0 (No)

Career Stage = 0-9 years' experience

vi

Career Stage = 10-19 years' experience

Career Stage = 30+ years' experience

ew

Career Stage = 20-29 years' experience

-.013

On

0a

a. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

ly

A separate regression analysis was performed of 2015 candidates. For this group,
two additional types of data were available: Name Recognition Proxy Measure and practice
context.56

56

See Appendix for an explanation of these variables.
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Table 2 Regression Analysis: 2015 Candidates

Sample: 2015 Candidates (n = 95)
Dependent Variable: Vote Share
Parameter
Intercept
Candidate Region = Not Toronto
Candidate Region = Toronto

B
.159

Std. Error
.024

t
6.590

Sig.
.000

-.014

.010

-1.325

.189

.013

-.388

.699

0a

Non-White Member = 0 (No)

-.005

r
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Non-White Member = 1 (Yes)

0a
.001

.018

.080

.937

Candidate's Practice Context = Small
Firm (2-5 Lawyers)

.031

.017

1.780

.079

Candidate's Practice Context = Medium
Firm (6-20 Lawyers)

.022

.028

.799

.427

.047

.018

2.571

.012

-.018

ew

.037

-.491

.624

.038

.025

1.544

.127

vi

Re

Candidate's Practice Context = Sole
Practitioner

Candidate's Practice Context = Large
Firm (20+ Lawyers)
Candidate's Practice Context =
Employed in Education

Candidate's Practice Context =
Employed in Other Context

0a
-.069

Candidate Female = 1 (Yes)

0a

Career Stage = 0-9 years' experience
Career Stage = 10-19 years' experience
Career Stage = 20-29 years' experience
Career Stage = 30+ years' experience
Name Recognition Proxy Measure

ly

Candidate Female = 0 (No)

On

Candidate's Practice Context =
Employed in Government

.011

-6.180

.000

-.032

.021

-1.557

.123

-.018

.014

-1.316

.192

-.002

.012

-.131

.896

.000

6.427

.000

0a
.002

a. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.
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4. Diversity in Regulatory Leadership and Voter Preferences
A. Non-White Status
The 2015 election was either a historical anomaly, or a breakthrough for non-white
candidates. The nine candidates who were elected constitute 22.5% of the total, which
exceeds their share among Ontario lawyers. This figure remains below the 26.2% share that
visible minorities and aboriginals together hold within Ontario's population according to the
2011 census.
Figure 1
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Proportion who are Racial Minority
Members
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24.84%
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Year
Ontario
Population
Ontario
Lawyers
Bencher
Candidates
(percent)
Bencher
Candidates
(number)
Elected
Candidates
(percent)
Elected
Candidates
(number)

On

Table 1: Proportion who are Non-White

2013

27.00%

18.00%

17.00%

2015
28.7%

16.90%

17.30%

9.52%

10.80%

14.44%

18.87%

18.95%

8

11

13

20

18

5.00%

7.50%

7.50%

2

3

3
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The average vote share received by non-white candidates in 2015 exceeded the
average share received by white candidates, while in previous elections the opposite was
true. However, the regression analysis shows no statistically significant correlation between
non-white status and vote share, either in 2015 or over all five elections.57 Thus, regarding
the funneling out of non-white individuals, hypothesis 1(a) cannot be rejected but
hypotheses 1(b) and 1(c) can be rejected on this data.58
Figure 2
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1999-2015
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B. Practice Context

Practice context is a "professional" dimension of diversity that many people want to
see reflected in lawyers' self-regulatory leadership. Concerns have been raised about
whether sole practitioners, corporate in-house counsel, and lawyers with non-litigation
practices are appropriately included in Ontario's Benchers.59 From this point of view, it is

57See

Table 1, supra. t(93) = = 0.948726, p > .05.
Section 3B, supra.
59 See Jennifer Brown, “Handful of Bencher Candidates Represent In-house Perspective,” Canadian Lawyer
Magazine (2015), accessed July 20, 2016, http://www.canadianlawyermag.com/5510/Handful-of-benchercandidates-represent-in-house-perspective.html; “Few Solicitors, Sole Practitioners at Convocation,” Advocate
Daily, accessed April 2016 http://www.advocatedaily.com/areas-of-law/few-solicitors-sole-practitioners-atconvocation.html.
58
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encouraging that the Benchers elected in 2015 include some lawyers with each of the major
employment statuses found in the Ontario bar (Figure 3).
That being said, the benchers are not perfectly representative along this dimension of
diversity. No in-house corporate lawyers were elected. Lawyers practicing in firms larger
than 20 are over-represented, with 22.9% of the province's lawyers but 35% of the benchers
(n = 14). According to the analysis in Table 2, practicing in a large firm (20+ lawyers) has a
significant positive effect on vote share received. Meanwhile the medium-size firms (6-20
lawyers) would require an additional 3-4 benchers to be proportionately represented, and

r
Fo

sole practitioners would require an additional 2-3 benchers. However, there is no significant
correlation between these other practice contexts and vote share. The data partially
supports Hypothesis 2 regarding the correlation between firm size and vote share.60
Figure 3

Re

9.60%
11.58%
5.00%

7.21%
6.32%
10.00%

4.23%
2.11%
2.50%

22.90%
24.21%
35.00%

13.42%
4.21%
5.00%

29.47%
22.50%
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Employed Ont.
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2015 Candidates
(total n = 95)
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(total n = 40)
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vi

Proportion by Employment Context in
2014/15

C. Gender
In the 2007, 2011, and 2015 elections, women were elected as benchers in numbers
proportionate to their share of the Ontario legal profession. Of the 120 benchers elected over

60

Section 3B, supra.
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this period, 43.3% (n=52) have been women. In 2013 women made up 41.9% of all Ontario
lawyers (Figure 1, red line below), confirming hypothesis 3(a). 61
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Section 3B, supra. However, women outnumber men among Ontario law students and newly called lawyers.
See “Statistical Snapshot of Lawyers from the Lawyer Annual Report (LAR) 2013,” The Law Society of Upper
Canada, accessed July 20, 2016, http://www.annualreport.lsuc.on.ca/2014/en/the-professions/snapshotslawyers.html.
61
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Figure 4: Proportion who are Female
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Table 2: Proportion who are Female

2009

2003

2006

2007

Ontario
Population

51.02%

62

51.12%
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Ontario
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33.10%

64
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38.00%
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51.23%

65
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50.70%
40.00%

66

41.90%

67

51.02%

63

43.17%

68

23.81%

26.47%
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32.08%

31.58%

Elected
Candidates

22.50%

27.50%

45.00%

45.00%

40.00%

ly

On

Bencher
Candidates

Projection, based on average of data from 2001, 2006, and 2011 censuses.
Projection, based on average of data from 2001, 2006, and 2011 censuses.
64 Projection based on statistic: 30.1% of all lawyers in Ontario ID as women as of 1996. See Michael Ornstein,
“Lawyers in Ontario: Evidence From the 1996 Census: A Report for The Law Society of Upper Canada,” accessed
July 20, 2016, http://www.lsuc.on.ca/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2147487148.
65 See Michael Ornstein, “Fact Sheet: Racialization and Gender of Lawyers in Ontario,” The Law Society of Upper
Canada (2010), accessed July 20, 2016,
http://www.lsuc.on.ca/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2147491863.
66 See “Statistical Snapshot of Lawyers in Ontario From 2010 Lawyer Annual Report,” The Law Society of Upper
Canada (2012), accessed July 20, 2016,
http://www.lsuc.on.ca/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2147488150.
67 See “Statistical Snapshot of Lawyers from the Lawyer Annual Report (LAR) 2013,” The Law Society of Upper
Canada, accessed July 20, 2016, http://www.annualreport.lsuc.on.ca/2014/en/the-professions/snapshotslawyers.html.
68 Projection, based on rate of growth 2006 to 2013.
62
63
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Consonant with Hypothesis 3(b), women are less likely than men are to be
candidates, in these as in some other elections.69 However, exactly 50% of the 144 female
candidates in bencher elections since 1999 were elected, compared to only 37.2% of the 341
male candidates. Female candidates have tended to attract more votes: an average vote
share of 17.7%, compared to 14.7% for the average male candidate.70 The linear regression
analyses show that gender has a significant effect after controlling for the other measured
variables such as candidate name recognition and years of experience. They also show that
the gender effect was larger in 2015 than it was in previous elections.71 Thus, Hypothesis

r
Fo

3(c) (voter preference for male candidates) can clearly be rejected on this data.72

D. Career Stage

Early-career lawyers make up the only group studied here that was significantly

Re

under-represented in the class of 2015 Benchers. Those who had been practicing for less
than 15 years, who made up almost half of all Ontario lawyers at the time (45.31% of the

vi

total, n=21,473), contributed only two of the 40 benchers elected in 2015 (Figure 5). These
two benchers had 12 and 13 years of experience respectively. None of the benchers elected

ew

in 2015 were among Ontario's lawyers in the first decade of practice, who made up 25-30%
of all lawyers in the province.

ly

On
69 Women were 43.17% of Ontario lawyers, but only 31.58% of the bencher candidates in 2015. See e.g.
Jennifer L. Lawless and Richard L. Fox, “It Still Takes A Candidate: Why Women Don't Run For Office” (June
2010).
70 t
(485) = 3.814693, p < .05.
71 Tables 1 and 2, supra.
72 Section 3B, supra.
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Figure 4
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The under-representation of recent licensees is not a new phenomenon. Of the 200
benchers elected in the five general Bencher elections since 1999, only six were licensed less
than 10 years before they were elected. Moreover, two of these six had lengthy careers in

On

other fields before being licensed as Ontario lawyers. The average bencher elected over this
period had been licensed in Ontario for 27.53 years at the time of his or her election.73

ly

Why are recent licensees under-represented?
On one level, the lack of early-career benchers is not surprising. Career stage is
obviously correlated to age, and older individuals predominate in most elections.74 The

73 Nor are law students and apprentices (known as "articling students" in Ontario) included. While legal selfregulatory organizations such as the Law Society of England and Wales have constituency seats for these future
lawyers, in Ontario they are allowed to neither vote nor serve as benchers. See Council Constituencies, supra
note 29.
74 See e.g. Brian Palmer, “Democracy or Gerontocracy: Is Congress getting older?” Slate, January 2, 2013,
accessed July 20, 2016,
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2013/01/average_age_of_members_of_u_s_congr
ess_are_our_senators_and_representatives.html.
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average age of benchers is similar to the average age of Canadian Members of Parliament.75
Nevertheless, it is worth asking why there aren't more early-career benchers, and the data
offers some insights on this point.
The candidate pool is one factor. Since 1999, only 10% of the bencher candidates (an
average of 9.8 candidates per election) have been in the first decades of their careers. In fact,
the average career stage of candidates has increased steadily over this time, from 21.06
years post-license in 1999 to 24.53 years post-license in 2015. Thus, hypothesis 4(a)
regarding funneling out of early-career lawyers at the nomination stage is supported.
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Voting patterns are also relevant. First-decade lawyers had an average vote share of
10.75%, compared to 16.04% for later-career candidates. Mean vote share per candidate
climbs along with experience category, and the regression analysis for all five elections

Re

(Table 1 above) shows that those in the first two experience categories (0-10 years and 1019 years) received significantly fewer votes than their more experienced colleagues did.76
Voters in Law Society elections may perceive later-career candidates to have advantages

vi

such as life experience, career security, and the discretion to dedicate more time to the work

ew

of serving in Convocation.

However in the 2015 candidate regression analysis, where name recognition data is
included, the career stage effect is no longer statistically significant.77 Thus, it is plausible

On

that candidate experience has a less important effect on voter behaviour than does name
recognition. If so, it is not necessarily (or not entirely) that voters in prefer older candidates

ly

per se, but rather that they tend to vote for candidates whom they have heard of. Given that
there is very little campaigning, name recognition will primarily be developed over time and
early career candidates are less likely to enjoy this advantage. Thus the data only partially
supports hypothesis 4(b) regarding funneling out of early-career lawyers at the vote-getting
stage.

See “Edging Towards Diversity A Statistical Breakdown of Canada’s 41st Parliament, with Comparisons to the
40th Parliament,” Public Policy Forum (June 2011): 4, accessed July 20, 2016,
http://www.ppforum.ca/sites/default/files/edging_towards_diversity_final.pdf.
76 Table 1, supra.
77 Table 2, supra.
75
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The candidate pool and voter behaviour cannot entirely explain the lack of earlycareer lawyers in Convocation. First-decade lawyers received 6.86% of all the votes cast in
the five elections since 1999, but made up only 3% of the benchers elected. The
constituency system, which is explored in the next section of this paper, is a significant cause
of the dearth of early-career lawyers in the Law Society's leadership.

5. Elite Sub-Groups, Selection Processes, and Diversity
In order to place the data in a broader context, this Part asks what the findings can
tell us about the relationship between selection processes and diversity. The consequences

r
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of the law society constituency system for Bencher diversity are considered first. An
argument for career stage constituencies in legal self-regulator elections is then made in
section 5(B). Finally, section 5(C) asks whether the relatively strong diversity of the 2015

Re

Benchers indicates a path toward greater diversity in other elite lawyer sub-groups such as
judges.

vi

A. Law Society Bencher Election Constituencies

ew

As noted above, the current Law Society constituency system is based entirely on
geography. It favours non-Toronto candidates, who need much fewer votes than their
Toronto colleagues do to be elected.78 It is possible, however, to imagine alternatives that

On

would have interesting effects on diversity. What if there were no geographic constituencies,
and the top 40 vote-getters in each election were elected? As Figure 6 shows, under this "Top
40" system the leadership since 1999 would have included more women, more visible

ly

minority lawyers, and more early-career lawyers. The number of non-white benchers
elected would have increased most dramatically, from 20 to 27. Thus, hypothesis 5,
regarding the effect of the status quo system on diversity, is clearly supported.79

78
79

Section 2(A), supra.
Section 3(B), supra.
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Figure 5
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The Top 40 system would have elected a more demographically diverse Convocation
because female, non-white, and early-career candidates are more likely to run in Toronto
than outside of the city.80 Tanya Walker and Renatta Austin, who ran in 2015 and would
have been elected under Top 40, are examples.81 This system would also, arguably, better

This, in turn reflects broader demographic patterns in the province. See Dinovitzer, supra note 14, 61
regarding the greater demographic diversity in Toronto. Regarding the greater proportion of visible minority
candidates in other elections in Toronto compared to the rest of the province, see Myer Siemiatycki, “The
Diversity Gap: The Electoral under-Representation of Visible Minorities,” (November 2011), accessed July 20,
2016, diversecitytoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/Final-Report.pdf.
81 Section 2(A), supra. Walker was subsequently appointed to Convocation : note 46, supra.
80
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reflect the collective democratic will of Ontario's lawyers, insofar as candidates like Walker
and Austin would be chosen instead of candidates who garnered less than half as many votes
as they did.
Unfortunately, these benefits would come at the expense of geographic diversity.
Over the five elections, top 40 would have produced 130 out of 200 elected benchers
practicing in Toronto, leaving non-Toronto lawyers under-represented relative to their
numbers in the profession. Also, it is worth recalling that the status quo system did elect
proportionate numbers of women and non-white lawyers in the 2015 election.82 Indeed,
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among the dimensions of diversity analyzed here, career stage is the only one for which the
most recent class of Benchers is significantly unrepresentative of Ontario's practicing bar.

B. For Career Stage Constituencies

Re

Introducing career stage constituencies, as candidate Renatta Austin proposed,83
would fix this problem without undermining geographic diversity. The By-Laws could be
amended to provide that each five-year career stage (lawyers with 0-5 years of practice;

vi

lawyers with 5-9 years of practice; etc.) must be represented by at least two Benchers, one

ew

from Toronto and one from elsewhere in Ontario. Like the Regional Benchers, the "Career
Stage Benchers" would be the candidates in each constituency who received the most votes
from within those constituencies.

On

Why should regulatory leadership include career stage diversity? Legal services
regulation should serve the public interest,84 and it should be client-centric as opposed to

ly

lawyer-centric.85 A regulator with career-stage diversity in its leadership can better meet
these challenges. Early career lawyers have first-hand insight into important regulatory
policy issues such as legal education (including the effects of tuition and debt) and the
licensing process. They are the only lawyers likely to be working as employed associates in
private practice. They can therefore speak knowledgeably in leadership meetings about key

Sections 4(A) and (B), supra.
See “Renatta Austin,” in The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 Bencher Election Results, accessed July 20,
2016, https://www.lsuc.on.ca/uploadedFiles/2015-bencher-election-results.pdf. Austin calls for eight Bencher
seats to be reserved for those in their first 10 years. This paper proposes two seats for those in their first years
and another two for those licensed 5-10 years.
84 Law Society Act, supra note 30, section 4.2(3).
85 Semple, Justitia's Legions, supra note 5, Chapter 9.
82
83
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issues like the ethical pressures of billable hour requirements and reconciling partners'
demands with clients' interests. In the words of early-career candidate Renatta Austin:
Adapting the regulatory model to the needs of the 21st century public,
ensuring fair and equal access to the legal profession and cultivating a
legal culture where diversity and inclusion are the norm, rather than
challenges to be overcome, are policy issues that primarily impact the
next generation of lawyers. Yet, we are largely excluded from the
governance table.86
That early-career lawyers have valuable perspectives on regulatory issues is
recognized by some within the Law Society. Twenty of the 2015 candidate statements made
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reference to special issues facing these lawyers,87 and Treasurer Janet Minor created a New
Licensee Roundtable to hear from these lawyers.88 While this attentiveness is commendable,
it would be even better to have the voices of early career lawyers heard in a democratic way

Re

within the leadership boardroom.

Guaranteeing early-career lawyers a voice within self-regulatory governance would

vi

also plausibly increase their participation in these elections. Turnout in Law Society bencher

ew

elections has declined steadily from 56.0% in 1987 to only 33.84% in 2015.89 In the 2015
election, only 31.02% of those licensed between 2001 and 2010 participated.90 Having the
right to select one of their own to present their distinct perspective in Convocation could be

On

a way to spark interest among relatively new lawyers.

It merits reiteration that failure to attract votes is not the only reason, or even the
primary reason why there are no early-career lawyers in Convocation. As noted above,

ly

under the pure democratic "Top 40" system, two lawyers in their first decades of practice
would have been elected in 2015, including Renatta Austin who was licensed in 2013.

The Law Society of Upper Canada 2011 Bencher Election Voting Guide, supra note 47.
Ibid.
88 Janet Minor, “Moving Ahead to Enhance and Engage,” Law Society of Upper Canada Gazette, June 25, 2015,
accessed July 20, 2016, http://www.lawsocietygazette.ca/treasurers-blog/moving-ahead/.
89 See “2015 Election Results and Voter Turnout Statistics 1987-2015,” The Law Society of Upper Canada, at 42,
accessed July 20, 2016, https://www.lsuc.on.ca/uploadedFiles/2015-bencher-election-results-book.pdf.
90 Ibid at 45.
86
87
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If early-career lawyers are to have their own constituencies, then why shouldn’t other
groups such as in-house corporate counsel, non-litigating solicitors, or sole practitioners?91
In the words of Bencher Raj Anand, “Once you start creating seats, it’s difficult to know
where to stop.”92 Would the present proposal slide the electoral system down a slippery
slope toward an elaborate tokenism with numerous niche constituencies? The result might
have little correspondence to the democratic will of the electorate as indicated by the top
vote-getters.
The law society embarked down the road of compromising pure “at large”
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democracy in favour of broad representativeness when it created geographic constituencies.
Perhaps the question should actually be, why stop travelling now? Constituencies promote
diversity and good decision-making, albeit at the expense of deviation from the collective
democratic will of the electorate.93 Travelling further down this road, representation could

Re

be based at least in part on communities of practice, defined by Lynn Mather et al as “groups
of lawyers with whom practitioners interact and to whom they compare themselves and

vi

look for common expectations and standards.”94 As noted above, groups such as American

system.95

ew

Bar Association and the Law Society of England and Wales have a somewhat comparable

Where exactly to stop on the road from pure democratic representation toward

ly

On

multiple constituencies is a question beyond the scope of this paper. The argument here is

Tali Folkins, “Prof calls for reforms to boost youth presence at Convocation,” Law Times, July 27 2015,
accessed July 20, 2016, http://www.lawtimesnews.com/201507274832/headline-news/prof-calls-forreforms-to-boost-youth-presence-at-convocation.
92 Ibid.
93 The Law Society's status quo geographic constituency system causes a much more significant deviation than
career stage constituencies would.
94 Lynn M. Mather, Craig A. McEwen and Richard J. Maiman, Divorce Lawyers at Work: Varieties of
Professionalism in Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 6. Regarding the importance of non-firm
communities of practice, such as lawyer groups based on sexuality and gender, see Christine Parker, Just
Lawyers: Regulation and Access to Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 149-151. A specialty
practice group such as criminal defence lawyers could also constitute a community of practice. The author has
suggested “community of practice representation” for self-regulators, wherein “lawyers’ communities of
practice within a state or province could be recognized as constituencies, each of which would be entitled to
elect representatives to the jurisdiction’s bar association or law society. … Each licensee would be allowed to
affiliate with one community of practice constituency, for the purpose of electing representatives to the central
body.” (Semple, Justitia’s Legions, supra note 5, 294-296).
95 Notes 28 and 29, supra and accompanying text.
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that, given the significant aspects of the public interest that early-career Benchers could
elucidate in Convocation, we should take at least this one further step down road.

C. Diversity of Benchers and other Legal Elites
The process by which elite lawyer subgroups are selected seems to have
consequences for the diversity of the groups. Notwithstanding the lack of early-career
lawyers, the Benchers elected in 2015 are significantly more diverse than other elite
Canadian lawyer sub-groups. They are clearly more demographically diverse than the
judiciary.96 They are also likely more diverse than large firm partners (although the data is

r
Fo

less clear on that point).

Why are Ontario’s benchers more demographically diverse than other elite subgroups? Can any lessons be drawn for those who would like to see more diversity on the

Re

bench and in large firm partners’ suites? Benchers are chosen in a transparent election, in
which any Ontario lawyer in good standing can run and each Ontario lawyer has an equal
number of votes. Judges and large firm partners, by contrast, are invited into their

vi

respective clubs after opaque, closed-door processes controlled by existing club members

ew

and other elite actors. Expanding the base of decision-makers, and increasing the
transparency of the decision-making process, might bring more diverse talent into these
other elite lawyer clubs. Transparency is favourable to diversity, as Lyon & Sossin among

On

others have pointed out.97 The “diversity gap” -- between our Benchers selected through
transparent elections on one hand, and our judges selected through mysterious backroom
consultations on the other -- arguably illustrates the relationship between transparency and

ly

diversity.

6. Conclusion
The diversity of lawyers in positions of self-regulatory leadership is important for at
least two reasons. First, these are "elite" positions within the profession which carry power
and prestige (as well as time commitments and service obligations). It would be highly
Supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text.
Lyon and Sossin, Data and Diversity, supra note 3; see also Lorne Sossin, "Transparency and Accountability
Reflected in Tracking of Osgoode’s Student Body," May 29, 2013, accessed July 20, 2016,
http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/prospective-students/jd-program/life-osgoode/transparency-accountabilityreflected-tracking-osgoodes-student-body/.
96
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problematic in equity terms if male, and/or "pale," and/or "stale" lawyers had preferential
access to them. Second, it stands to reason that self-regulatory governance will work best
when it can draw on the talents and perspectives of as many parts of the profession as
possible.
Self-regulatory organizations and their governance matter. Admittedly, some still
follow Max Weber and write SROs off as mere stalking horses for privileged occupational
groups dedicated to “closure of social and economic opportunities to outsiders.”98 However
a more optimistic school envisions SROs creating opportunity, equity, and stability: not only
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for the diverse workers, but also for diverse clientele and for society as a whole.99 Across the
common law world, legal self-regulatory organizations today take influential if not
determinative positions on questions of legal education, access to the profession, and access
to justice. The Law Society of Upper Canada, for example, is confronted with controversies

Re

about mandatory apprenticeship,100 paralegal scope of practice,101 and alternative business
structures for law firms.102 From this point of view, it is clear that the diversity and quality

vi

of law society and bar association leadership is relevant not only to practitioners of law but

ew

also to all those for whom law is practiced.

It is therefore encouraging to find that the lawyer benchers of the Law Society of
Upper Canada elected in 2015 are broadly representative of Ontario's legal profession in

On
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Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology 342, 344 (1922) Guenther Roth and
Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff tr., New York: Bedminster Press, 1968. See also Richard Abel, American
Lawyers (New ed. Oxford University Press: New York, 1989); Harry Arthurs, ‘The Dead Parrot: Does
Professional Self-Regulation Exhibit Vital Signs?,’ Alberta Law Review 33 (1995): 800, 802; Semple, Justitia's
Legions, supra note 5, 115-128.
99 Emile Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals (Brookfield trans. [1890] Routledge: New York, 1992);
Talcott Parsons, ‘The Professions and Social Structure,’ 17 Social Forces 457, 463–4 (1939); Robert K. Merton,
‘The Functions of the Professional Association,’ The American Journal of Nursing 58 (1958) : 505; W.H.
Hurlburt, The Self-Regulation of the Legal Profession in Canada and in England and Wales 125 (Law Society of
Alberta and Alberta Law Reform Institute: Calgary and Edmonton, 2000); Eliot Freidson, Professionalism: The
Third Logic (Polity Press: Cambridge, 2001); Semple, Justitia's Legions, supra note 5, 195-201; 287 et seq.
100 Wiseman, David. "The Law Society of Upper Canada and Access to Justice: Lessons from Lawyer-Licensing
Reform." Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 31 (2013) , accessed July 27, 2016
http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/WYAJ/article/view/4417.
101 Ministry of the Attorney General (Ontario). "Family Legal Services Review Consultation Paper (February 9,
2016)." Toronto: MAG (Ontario), 2016. Online:
http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/family/legal_services_consultation_paper.html.
102 Law Society of Upper Canada. "Alternative Business Structures Working Group Report." (Toronto: LSUC,
2015.) Online: http://www.lsuc.on.ca/uploadedFiles/ABS-full-report.pdf.
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terms of gender, non-white status, and practice context. They are somewhat more "male"
and "pale" than the general population, but no more so than the average Ontario lawyer.
Only time will tell whether non-white candidates’ strong performance in 2015 was a blip or
a breakthrough. Other important dimensions of diversity, such as sexuality and socioeconomic status, cannot be evaluated on the basis of this data. However, being a woman has
consistently conferred a significant apparent advantage to candidates in attracting votes.
Despite the apparent diversity success in terms of gender and race, the lack of early
career lawyers was a gaping hole in the 2015 Convocation. While not necessarily "stale," the
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average bencher was certainly in the middle or late stage of his career. Just as the lawyers of
each region have the right to elect candidates from among themselves, lawyers in each 5year career stage segment should be given the right to select two representatives to
Convocation. This modest reform is arguably the last missing piece of the diversity puzzle at

Re

the Law Society. Introducing it now will help ensure that the Law Society can continue to
confront its many challenges and opportunities as a robust and vital public interest

ew

vi

regulator.

Appendix: Independent Variables for Statistical Analysis
The independent variables in this analysis are as follows:

On

(i)

Candidate Region. As noted above, the province is divided into 8 regions.
Toronto is one of these, and 20 of the 40 benchers are elected from Toronto.
Candidate Visible Minority or Aboriginal (yes/no). The team read each

ly

(ii)

candidate statement. Based on the candidate's name, picture, and statement, each
team member indicated whether or not the candidate was, in the team member's
opinion, either (i) a member of a visible minority as defined by Statistics
Canada,103 or (ii) a member of an aboriginal group. Candidates meeting either one

“This category includes persons who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour and who do not
report being Aboriginal.” (“Classification of Visible Minority,” Statistics Canada, (2015), accessed July 20, 2016,
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/eng/concepts/definitions/minority01a.)
103
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of these criteria, according to a majority of the three raters, were coded as nonwhite.104
(iii)

Candidate's Practice Context. The following practice categories, used by the
Law Society in its statistical reporting, were also used in this study: (1) Sole
Practitioner; (2) Small Firm (2-5 Lawyers); (3) Medium Firm (6-20 Lawyers); (4)
Large Firm (20+ Lawyers); (4) Employed in Education; (5) Employed in
Government; and (6) Employed in Other Context (including corporate and nonprofit sectors).
Candidate Female (yes/no). This was also coded by team members based on

r
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(iv)

reading the statements and looking at the accompanying pictures.
(v)

Career Stage (2015 candidates only). The year in which the candidate was first

Re

licensed to practice law in Ontario was subtracted from the year of the election to
give the candidate's years of experience at the time of the election.105 Years of

vi

experience were aggregated into career stage categories: (1) 0-9 years; (2) 10-19
years; (3) 20-29 years; (4) 30+ years.

ew

(vi)

Name recognition proxy measure (NRPM) (2015 candidates only). This
measure included (i) the number of times the candidate had been mentioned in

On

the two trade newspapers for Ontario lawyers, and (ii) the number of times the
candidate's name appeared in AccessCLE, which is the Law Society's database of
continuing legal education articles and presentations.106 For each of the 2015

ly

candidates, the number of hits from these sources prior to election day in 2015
was tallied. The reasoning behind this proxy measure is that the more often a
candidate's name appeared in an Ontario legal trade newspaper, and the more
often he or she spoke at events for Ontario lawyers, the more likely it is that his or
her name would have been recognized by voters reviewing the bencher election

This method may categorize some candidates in a manner different than how they would self-identify.
In those cases where this information was not part of the statement, it was sought on the internet. In a few
cases (fewer than 15) where the information was not available online, the candidate's year of license was
guessed based on his or her picture and the assumption that the license was received when the candidate was
26 years old.
106 “AccessCLE,” The Law Society of Upper Canada, accessed July 20, 2016,
http://lx07.lsuc.on.ca/R?RN=111141537.
104
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ballots. NRPM is not a dimension of diversity. However, as explained above,107 it is
correlated with vote share and its use strengthens the study’s conclusion about
the effects of gender.
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When lawyers elect the leaders of their self-regulatory organizations, what sort of
people do they vote for? How does electoral system design affect the ability of law
societies and bar associations to understand and regulate a diverse legal
profession? This article quantitatively assesses the demographic and professional
diversity of leadership in the Barreau du Haut-Canada. After many years of
underrepresentation, in 2015 visible minority members and women were elected in
numbers proportionate to their shares of Ontario lawyers. Regression analysis
suggests that being non-white was not a disadvantage in the 2015 election, and
being female actually conferred an advantage in attracting lawyers’ votes. The
diverse employment contexts of the province’s lawyers were also represented in the
elected group. However early career lawyers were completely unrepresented. This
is largely a consequence of electoral system design choices, and can be remedied
through the implementation of career stage constituencies.
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Mots clés : diversité, profession juridique, réglementation des services juridiques,
analyse quantitative, conception ces systèmes de vote
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Lorsque les avocats élisent les chefs de leurs organes d’auto-réglementation, quel
genre de leader choisissent-ils? Comment la conception du système électoral influet-elle sur la capacité des barreaux de comprendre et réglementer une profession si
diverse? Cet article effectue une évaluation quantitative de la démographie et
diversité professionnelle du leadership du Barreau du Haut-Canada. Après de
nombreuses années de sous-représentation, en 2015, des membres de minorités
visibles et des femmes ont été élus dans une proportion représentative de leur
importance dans la profession en Ontario. Une analyse de régression permet de
conclure que, dans l’élection de 2015, ne pas être de race blanche n’était pas un
handicap, et qu’être femme était avantageux en ce que cela suscitait davantage de
votes. La diversité des contextes d’emploi des avocats en Ontario était également
bien représentée parmi les élus. Par contre, les avocats frais émoulus n’étaient pas
représentés du tout, du fait de décisions prises dans la conception du système de
vote. Cet inconvénient peut être remédié par la création d’une catégorie
correspondant aux étapes de carrière.
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